


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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON



December 11, 1958

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Modification of NSC Procedures

- REFERENCES:
- A. Memo for the Planning Board, "Proposed Modifications of NSC Procedures," December 3, 1958
 - B. Memo for the Planning Board, "Work of the NSC Planning Board," December 5, 1958
 - C. Record of Meeting of the NSC Planning Board, December 9, 1958

The enclosed modifications of NSC procedures, as approved by the Planning Board on December 9, are transmitted herewith for the information and use of the Planning Board on a trial basis as guides in the development of national security policy by the Planning Board.

MARION W. BOGGS
Director, Policy
Coordinating Secretariat

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MODIFICATION OF NSC PROCEDURES

1. The Planning Board, in connection with its discussion of any OCB Report which recommends a review of policy, will identify any major alternative lines of policy which might be considered and will discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of such alternatives. On the basis of this discussion, the Planning Board will determine whether it would be desirable to prepare for Council discussion a statement of alternatives without recommendations. If such a statement is prepared, it will be scheduled on the agenda of a Council meeting along with the OCB Report which recommended the policy review, and will be circulated to the Council sufficiently in advance of this meeting to permit staff advice to Council Members and Advisers as a basis for preliminary comments on the alternatives. However, the Council would be asked not to make a decision as to a choice between alternatives pending further Planning Board and Council consideration.

Purpose: To insure that alternatives are taken into account, to provide a basis for a more meaningful Council discussion of OCB Reports, and to provide Council (including Presidential) guidance to the Planning Board in its preparation of policy revisions.

2. When the Planning Board undertakes to prepare a draft statement of policy on a subject not previously covered by an NSC paper, the first step should be the preparation of a Staff Study, which should include both an analysis of the situation (with a summary of all existing commitments and programs with their costs) and an analysis of any feasible policy alternatives open to the U. S. with considerations for and against each alternative.* The Staff Study, or at least the analysis of alternatives, should be discussed by the Planning Board before a draft statement of policy is prepared, and subsequently circulated to the Council for information along with the Planning Board draft statement of policy.

* Normally the Planning Board would depend on the relevant OCB Report referred to in 1 above, for up-to-date information required for revision of an existing policy statement. However, in exceptional circumstances, involving major revision of an existing policy statement, the Planning Board might call for a Staff Study prior to formulation of a new draft statement of policy.

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Purpose: To provide more information on areas not previously considered by the Planning Board, to insure that alternatives are taken into account, and to provide Planning Board guidance to the drafting agency or the Board Assistants in the preparation of a draft statement of policy.

3. An initial draft of a statement of policy (whether a draft revision of existing policy or the initial draft of a new policy), after submission by the drafting agency, should be considered by the Board Assistants before consideration or discussion by the Planning Board. The Board Assistants would be expected to put the paper in the best format for Planning Board consideration; to take into account, with the assistance of the NSC Staff, any Council and Presidential guidance provided by Council discussion of an OCB Report (par. 1 above) or Planning Board discussion of a Staff Study (par. 2 above); to define the issues and clarify the "splits"; and to incorporate in the paper the views of agencies other than the drafting agency. For maximum effectiveness, time should be allowed for "staffing" in the agencies (specifically including consultation between individual Board Assistants and their Planning Board members).

Purpose: To conserve the time and increase the efficiency of the Planning Board through preliminary Board Assistants drafting, identification of issues and inter-departmental coordination prior to Planning Board consideration.

4. At each Tuesday meeting of the Planning Board* the CIA Adviser should give the Planning Board a brief preview of the major topics likely to be covered in the DCI briefing at the Council meeting on the following Thursday. Other Planning Board members should also feel free to bring up any significant national security developments in their respective areas of responsibility. The Planning Board should discuss these informal briefings and determine whether any developments covered therein are of such significance to national security policy as to warrant being singled out for Council discussion. In the case of certain topics agreed upon by the Planning Board as suitable for Council discussion, the Planning Board might suggest questions which Mr. Gray might raise at the Council meeting as a basis for such Council discussion. The statement of these questions would

* The Tuesday meeting should be held at 2:00 p.m. instead of 10:00 a.m.

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include a summary of applicable existing policy. In the case of other topics, the Planning Board might request that an oral report be given by a Council member (e.g., the Secretary of State) at the Council meeting, either at the next Council meeting or on the second Thursday following the Tuesday Planning Board discussion.

Purpose: To insure that significant developments are brought to the timely attention of the Planning Board, to stimulate Council discussion of significant developments on a current basis, and to provide Council and Presidential guidance on the topics discussed.

5. A minimum of five working days should normally be allowed for initial Planning Board drafts, and three working days for subsequent drafts, from the time the drafts are circulated until they are considered by the Planning Board or Board Assistants.

Purpose: To insure that departments and agencies are afforded adequate time to staff papers prior to Planning Board and Board Assistants meetings.

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**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON**

December 5, 1958

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Work of the NSC Planning Board

REFERENCE: Memo for NSC Planning Board, "Proposed Modifications of
NSC Procedure", December 3, 1958

The enclosed "Thoughts on the NSC Planning Board", submitted by
the State Member, are transmitted herewith for discussion by the
Planning Board at its meeting today in connection with its
consideration of procedures.

MARION W. BOGGS
Director, Policy
Coordinating Secretariat

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Subject: Some Thoughts on the NSC Planning Board

I. Substance of Policy

A number of new papers seem required. They would have value in themselves, and value in resisting a tendency to consider the NSC library complete save for periodic revisions of existing papers. In part this tendency is strengthened by the energetic OCB Progress Report playbacks which in calling for periodic revisions of existing papers, tend to freeze the pattern. Some of the new papers might be:

A. Domestic Factors

1. For the past several years the work of the Planning Board has been dominated by problems of foreign policy; the care of alliances, the encouragement of the non-aligned, the restriction of Communist power. Two factors account for this: (a) the novelty of the persistent intrusion of the outer world into our domestic affairs; (b) the tradition of comfortable assumptions that dominates our thinking about our own society. For the period ahead, the Planning Board will have to devote more attention to the domestic underpinnings of national power.

2. The Gaither Report provides evidence that we have taken too lightly the critical difference between potential and actual power and that we have repeatedly underestimated the capabilities of an adversary inflexibly concentrating his growing industrial capacity on military applications. In the immediate period ahead, the Planning Board should address itself to the extraordinary actions required to: //

- (a) ensure the deterrent
- (b) preserve technological lead
- (c) organize society for survival under nuclear attack

Full accomplishment of the Planning Board task will include recommendations as to ways and means to transmit the urgencies of the SRP Report to the American people.

3. Assuming that the short range needs are met we shall still have the problem of requirements for the long haul. The Planning Board might well consider or commission, a series of studies in the vast field of the domestic foundations of national security. As examples:

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- (a) The kinds of sacrifices required for what the President once called "not a moment but an age of danger."
- (b) An inventory of skilled manpower requirements for national security over the next 10 to 20 years, in such fields as physical science, professional military, languages, economic development; with recommendations for necessary additional incentives. (It will be important to link urgencies of needs in languages and area specialization, and in political and economic skills with any new programs.
- (c) Means to counter the steadily improving Soviet capacity for manipulating foreign public opinion. These means may well involve a much greater degree of control and coordination over the timing and content of our own official and quasi-official information exertions.

B. Nuclear Weapons Policy

The Planning Board, or some restricted group thereof, might well attempt to formulate principles governing the use of nuclear weapons. The approach should be not so much, "whether to use" as "how to use." The study should include the advance actions we might take:

- (1) to prepare our allies and the nonaligned for our possible use of such weapons, and
- (2) to prepare our own people for the possibility that nuclear weapons might be employed against our forces in hostilities short of general war.

C. Political Stability

1. Almost every paper we have written over the past several years dealing with the newer states and the less developed world has contained passing references to "political stability," "effective government" and "efficient administration." We have written about force levels in extended detail and about economic aid programs with almost

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bookkeeping exactitude. Somehow, however, we tend to assume that if external aggression can be deterred, internal security maintained, economic development launched, political stability will come about by some natural, if nebulous, process. We are an optimistic people.

2. Nothing is more difficult than the management of the democratic process. The Planning Board might well examine and report to the Council on the adequacy of our programs for assisting the leaders of the new states to improve political "know-how."

3. To Asia and Africa, communism is more than a set of goals. It is a means of action and an opportunity for activity. It is organization. We need to concentrate much more on the political process and organizational means. We need improved ways and means to assist second and third echelon leaders in the acquisition of such indispensable skills as how to organize a precinct, how to run a party at provincial and municipal levels, how to conduct press relations. And we ourselves, I suspect, need to study more closely how to relate our own aid programs to their efforts in these respects.

D. Negative Policies

1. The Planning Board might well direct some of its attention toward negative policies: to make, as need be, our displeasure meaningful. At present we have only the technique of withholding affirmative aid, and this can be discounted in advance by regimes willing to incur known risks in bargaining for compensation from the Soviets. We may have become overly impressed with the theory that the only beneficiary of hard times will be the local Communists.

2. A study of a possible negative policy might be done on a case study or gaming model. We might conclude that certain sums might be set aside for economic warfare purposes under specified contingencies and directed toward a convincing demonstration that the risks of affronting the U. S. cannot be completely calculated in advance. If we succeeded, we would, of course incidentally increase the costs and complicate the success of Communist assistance programs.

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II. - Form of Papers

A. Objectives

1. That part of NSC papers which most urgently requires rethinking seems to be "The Objectives." We have for some time concentrated so much on means that we may have lost a sense of ends. The highly general statements of objectives found in most papers are stylized, abstract, interchangeable and timeless. The relation between policy guidance and objectives is seldom clear or casual.

2. Even so mechanical a measure of separating objectives into "long range" and "short range" would work some improvement. It might be possible to go beyond this: to state as short range objectives what we think we can accomplish over a two or three year period by the courses of action which follow and with the resources estimated in the Financial Annex. We might include as part of the Objectives' section, or as a separate statement of "strategy," a basic paragraph or two on the main lines of our effort with respect to a given country for the period immediately ahead: how we see the problem; what are our real options, where do the emphases go?

B. Alternatives

1. We should make much greater use of the alternatives technique. We should set out for the Council broad policy choices, with analyses of their political, economic and military implications. It might not be necessary to use these for all country papers but they should be entertained for all major papers. In some cases it may be possible to write a complete Planning Board paper with Alternatives enumerated; in other cases it may be preferable to go to the Council first with an Alternatives paper.

2. In almost every case, Alternatives should include roles and missions of the indigenous forces concerned and should contain as precise estimates as can be obtained for each, of force levels, of types of weapons to be supplied, of the disposition and planned participation of U. S. forces in or near the country, and of costs.

3. Similarly, it might be useful from time to time to submit Alternatives with respect to political arrangements and economic assistance programs. It may well be that Alternative Financial Annexes should also be put to the Council.

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C. Cross Analysis

1. Greater use should perhaps be made of cross-analysis in some of the more important or controversial Council subjects. For example, in the field of weapons systems, the Council should not always receive merely a Service briefing as a completed exercise. On occasions the other two Services might be invited to criticize or to question the proponents.

2. Similarly, in the political field, instead of receiving integrated estimates from the Department or CIA, the Planning Board might find it provocative to have presentations on problems such as North Africa by teams organized not on a departmental or agency basis but representing the several French and the several Afro-Asian desks around town.

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